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I. INTRODUCTION
As the cost and delay of litigation in national courts continue to rise,
parties contemplating a contractual relationship have sought alternative
methods of dispute resolution. One of the most prevalent techniques of
alternative dispute resolution is arbitration. In fact, in recent decades, a
profusion of organizations have sprung into being, specializing in both
national and international arbitration.' Nation-states also have encouraged
the use of arbitration by passing legislation recognizing, both nationally and
internationally, the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate and any
corresponding arbitral awards. Furthermore, national courts have encouraged
the use of arbitration by interpreting liberally these national and international
accords in favor of arbitration.
This Article will focus on current attempts by parties to expand or limit
contractually the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards. Specific
attention will be paid to the differing public policy implications that such
expansion or limitation may have on both national and international
arbitration. In order to gain an overview of the current situation, the first Part
of this Article will focus upon the prevailing law on judicial review of
arbitral awards. In this regard, traditional judicial review is extremely limited
by both national legislation and international treaty.
The second Part will explore recent attempts by parties both to expand
and limit the traditional scope of judicial review. In the context of the
expansion of judicial review, differing opinions of various U.S. courts will
be discussed in order to gain insight into the issues and implications of such
an expansion. On the other hand, in regards to the limitation of judicial
review, various opinions of English Commonwealth and European
jurisdictions will be explored.
Finally, the last Part will discuss the apparent conflicting public policy
goals behind the contractual expansion and limitation of the judicial review
of arbitral awards. The focus will be on several intrinsically important yet
I Many of these arbitral organizations, such as the International Chamber of
Commerce and the American Arbitration Association, located in Paris and New York,
respectively, were formed many decades ago. However, in the last few decades an
abundance of new and increasingly geographically specialized organizations have come
into existence.
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seemingly irreconcilable goals behind both commercial transactions and
arbitration, such as freedom of contract versus predictability and certainty of
arbitral awards. This Part will advance solutions and attempt to reconcile
these public policy goals in order to maintain the greatest freedom of
contract while, at the same time, assuring the quick and certain resolution of
disputes. Specifically, this Article will advocate that freedom of contract and
the ability of arbitrators to- settle disputes quickly and efficiently can be
maintained best by the recognition of agreements limiting judicial review of
arbitral awards while simultaneously invalidating those agreements
attempting to expand review. Only through such a method can the integrity
of the arbitral process be maintained and the quick resolution of disputes be
assured, which, in the end, is the ultimate goal of any contractual provision
involving the resolution of disputes.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBrrRAL AWARDS UNDER CURRENT
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Traditionally, national courts have intervened in arbitral proceedings in
the following two situations: first, at the onset of arbitration to determine
whether the agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable or, in other
words, whether the issue itself is arbitrable or whether it concerns an area
where public policy dictates that all such disputes be resolved by the courts;
and second, at the end of an arbitration, when a court is asked to enforce an
arbitral award and the court reviews the award to ensure that the award's
enforcement will not violate any procedural due process or 'other public
policy concerns. As arbitration has gained acceptance, both nationally and
internationally, the United States and foreign nations have passed legislation
to enforce both agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards.
In the United States, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act2
(FAA) in 1925. The expressed intention of the FAA was to reverse past
judicial animosity toward arbitration and place arbitration agreements "upon
the same footing as other contracts."'3 On an international scale, most of the
world's leading trading nations, including the United States, have acceded to
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
3 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924). See United States Asphalt Refining Co. v.
Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), for an example of
the early U.S. judicial hostility toward arbitration. Also, for a discussion of the English
tradition and history leading to this initial distrust of arbitration, see Kulukundis Shipping
Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir. 1942).
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Arbitral Awards 4 (the "New York Convention"). The FAA and the New
York Convention reversed the traditional judicial hostility towards
arbitration and succeeded in transforming the United States into an
"arbitration friendly" jurisdiction. 5 Today, U.S. courts routinely validate and
enforce arbitral agreements even though they may implicate fundamental
issues of deeply held public policy, such as securities violations, 6 RICO
claims,7 antitrust causes of action,8 employment discrimination, 9 and civil
rights cases,10 to name just a few. 11
However, judicial recognition of arbitral agreements is only the first
step; courts still need to recognize and enforce corresponding awards by
arbitrators. Long before the enactment of either the FAA or the New York
Convention, the United States Supreme Court held that arbitral awards
4 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The
terms of the New York Convention were made binding upon the United States by its own
law. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1994) (providing, inter alia, that the "Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be
enforced in United States courts ... ").
5 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)
(finding that the FAA "accomplishes [its] purpose" of reversing the policy of judicial
hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements).
6 See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-20 (1974); see also
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-85 (1989),
overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
7 See, e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238-42.
8 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628-40 (1985).
9 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-35 (1991)
(holding that causes of action arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 11I 1997), are arbitrable, and
reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in
Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989)).
10 See, e.g., Feinberg v. Bear, Steams & Co., No. 90 Civ. 5250 (JFK), 1991 WL
79309, at *2-*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1991). However, the arbitrability of Title VII and
other civil rights causes of action remains controversial. See G. Richard Shell, ERISA and
Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate
Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEx. L. REV. 509, 569-70 (1990).
11 In fact, in recent years there have been relatively few areas in which the federal
courts have not allowed parties to arbitrate disputes because of public policy concerns.
See Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 118-22 (2d Cir. 1991);
see also Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1115-21
(3d Cir. 1993) (holding claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
arbitrable); Genesco, Inc. v. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987) (ruling that
claims under the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act can be arbitrated).
340
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should be enforced to assure the quick settlement of disputes and encourage
the use of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution technique. 12 In
keeping with this tradition, both the FAA and the New York Convention
specifically hold that enforcement of arbitral awards should be granted and
upheld routinely. 13 Nonetheless, the FAA and New York Convention both
contain similar "laundry lists" of exceptions by which a court may vacate an
arbitral award. 14 These exceptions include various safeguards to assure that
minimum levels of procedural and substantive due process are observed in
arbitral proceedings, 15 a public policy exception to enforcement, 16 and, in
the United States, a judicially created exception to enforcement where an
award is rendered in "manifest disregard" of the law. 17
12 In Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854), the United States Supreme Court
stated:
If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the
arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it
aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the
judgment of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would
make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation..
Id. at 349.
13 See Federal Arbitration Act §§ 2, 9, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (1994); New York
Convention, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40.
14 See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994); see also New York
Convention, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42. The grounds for
vacating an arbitral award under the FAA are located in section 10 and include, among
other things, the following: cases in which the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1); cases in which evidence of arbitrator impartiality or
corruption, see id. § 10(a)(2); cases involving arbitrator misconduct which prejudices the
rights of the parties, see id. § 10(a)(3); and cases in which'the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, see id. § 10(a)(4). On the other hand, Article V of the New York Convention
contains similar rationales for refusing award recognition and enforcement, including the
following: party incapacity or the agreement was invalid for some other reason under the
applicable law, see New York Convention, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 40; a party lacked proper notice of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present a case, see id., 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42; the award
contained decisions on matters beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement, see id.; the
subject matter was nonarbitrable, see id.; and enforcement would be contrary to the
public policy of the enforcing country, see id.
15 See infra Part II.A.
16 See infra Part II.B.
17 See infra Part ll.C.
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A. Procedural and Substantive Due Process Exceptions to Award
Enforcement
The FAA and the New York Convention both contain exceptions to an
arbitral award's enforcement to assure that a certain level of procedural and
substantive due process is observed in the arbitral proceedings. A commonly
asserted exception to enforcement by a party attempting to annul an arbitral
award is that the arbitrators "exceeded their powers,"'18 or, phrased
differently, that the award dealt with issues beyond the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate.' 9 This exception rarely is employed successfully, for
several reasons. First, the use of standardized arbitration clauses in
commercial contracts provides assurance that the scope of an arbitral clause
will encompass almost every conceivable issue.20 Second, courts rarely
second guess and overrule an arbitrator's construction of the parties'
agreement to arbitrate due to the fact that there exists a judicially created
"powerful presumption" that the arbitrator acted within his power.21 Third,
courts liberally construe agreements to arbitrate to include most issues
within their scope, even when the scope of an agreement is questionable. 22
18 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
19 See New York Convention, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
20 Various international arbitration organizations have promulgated standard
arbitration clauses that are recognized internationally as enveloping most, if not all,
issues of litigation within their scope. See, e.g., ARBITRATION RULES, MODEL
ARBITRATION CLAUSE art. 1.1 n.* (United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law 1976)
("Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as at present force."); INT'L ARBITRATION RULES,
MODEL ARBITRATION CLAUSE (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1992) ("Any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this contract shall be determined by arbitration
in. . . accordance with the International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association."); RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, STANDARD ICC
ARBITRATION CLAUSE (Int'l Chamber of Commerce 1988) ("All disputes arising in
connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more
arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.").
21 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier
(Rafta), 508 F.2d 969, 976-77 (2d Cir. 1974); Avraham v. Shigur Express Ltd., No. 91
Civ. 1238 (SWK), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267, at *7-*14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1991).
22 In the United States, see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). In England, see Ulysses Compania
Naviera SA v. Huntingdon Petroleum Services Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 160, 163-66 (Q.B.
Com. Ct. 1990). The tendency of courts to interpret arbitral clauses as including within
their scope questionable issues is probably part of the overall tendency of both courts and
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Other due process concerns focus on the inability or difficulty of the
arbitral process to subpoena witnesses or conduct discovery on the same
level as that of a national court. Nonetheless, U.S. courts have stated that a
party, by agreeing to arbitrate, relinquishes its right tb subpoena witnesses
and other rights that it may have had in court in favor of arbitration, with all
of its "advantages and drawbacks." 23 Therefore, the mere inability to
produce witnesses is not sufficiently violative of a party's due process rights
to avoid enforcement of a corresponding arbitral award. Courts are likewise
reluctant to enjoin the enforcement of an arbitral award even on the grounds
of fraud, holding that "the fraud must not have been discoverable upon the
exercise of due diligence prior to the arbitration" and must "relate to a
material issue."24 Moreover, a party contending that an award should not be
enforced due to a procedural deficiency first must demonstrate that'the right
to contest the procedural deficiency was preserved during the arbitral
proceeding. In other words, the party must show that the procedural
deficiency was presented to the arbitral tribunal and ignored in order to
employ the deficiency as an argument for avoiding enforcement of the
award. 25
The FAA and the New York Convention also provide exceptions to the
enforcement of an award on the basis of party incapacity, illegality of the
arbitral agreement, and arbitrator corruption or fraud.26 These exceptions to
enforcement are of the type that would prevent even the enforcement of a
judicial award. However, courts seldom deny the enforcement of an award
on these bases. This is mainly due to the fact that these exceptions deal with
extreme situations that rarely manifest themselves. Nevertheless, even when
arbitrator corruption or fraud is suspected, the party opposing the award
must corroborate evident partiality by focusing on the relationship between
the arbitrators and the other party, such as economic or personal ties between
the two.27 Arbitrator corruption or fraud "cannot be inferred simply" from
legislatures to eliminate the historical judicial hostility towards arbitration. See supra
notes 2-12 and accompanying text.
23 Parsons, 508 F.2d at 975; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
24 National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800, 814 (D. Del. 1990);
see also LaFarge Conseils et Etudes v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334,
1338 (9th Cir. 1986).
25 See International Std. Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, 745 F.
Supp. 172, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
26 See Federal Arbitration Act § 10(a)(1)-(2), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(2) (1994); New
York Convention, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42.
27 See Sidarma Societa Italiana di Armamento Spa, Venice v. Holt Marine Indus.,
Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981).
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the fact that the arbitrator's findings were unsupported by the weight of the
evidence. 28
Parties opposing an arbitral award have attempted to annul enforcement
on the basis that the arbitration agreement constituted a contract of adhesion.
Courts have denied these attempts to describe arbitral agreements as
contracts of adhesion affirmatively and categorically. 29 Finally, parties
opposing an arbitral award have attempted to re-employ the nonarbitrability
defense by reasserting, at the award enforcement stage, that a court should
refuse enforcement because the underlying issue was nonarbitrable at the
outset. 30 In reality, the nonarbitrability exception to award enforcement is
rarely asserted.31 Moreover, recent case law from the United States Supreme
Court in the last few decades further has regulated the nonarbitrability
exception to award enforcement to a mere academic oddity.32 In fact, some
commentators suggest that U.S. courts should cease altogether to recognize
the nonarbitrability defense in award enforcement proceedings. 33
The procedural and substantive due process exceptions to award
enforcement, while frequently pleaded, are rarely successful. The
nonarbitrability of the subject matter exception is merely an attempt to
relitigate the arbitrability question, which properly should be litigated, if at
all, before the arbitration begins; and the United States Supreme Court has
consistently found in favor of arbitration. The other due process exceptions
to enforcement, such as scope of the arbitral clause, discovery deficiencies,
28 In re Southwind Shipping Co., 709 F. Supp. 79, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
29 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
632-33 (1985); David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249
(2d Cir. 1991); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, No. 91-13345
WF, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5672, at *8-*13 (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 1993) (holding that
arbitration clauses are not per se adhesional and, even if they were, that they are not
unconscionable, and as such are not void as contracts of adhesion), aff'd, 515 U.S. 528,
532 (1995) (affirming the district court's opinion without further comment on the
contract of adhesion issue).
30 See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 42.
31 The Second Circuit quickly rejected the nonarbitrability exception, reasoning that
"the mere fact that an issue of national interest may incidentally figure into the resolution
of a breach of contract claim does not make the dispute not arbitrable." Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (Rafta), 508 F.2d
969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974).
32 See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., Heather R. Evans, The Nonarbitrability of Subject Matter Defense to
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States Federal Courts, 21 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 329, 352 (1989).
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and arbitrator corruption or fraud arise either from poorly worded arbitration
agreements or from problems in the arbitral process. As arbitration has
become more accepted and employed, both arbitral clauses and the arbitral
process have improved, limiting the need of these exceptions to enforcement.
However, the due process exceptions are not the only exceptions to
enforcement. On the contrary, the most frequently employed and litigated
enforcement exception is the public policy exception, which is complicated
by the various choices of law open to parties to an arbitration.
B. The Public Policy Exception to Award Enforcement
The New York Convention and the FAA both dictate that an enforcing
court may34 refuse to recognize or enforce an arbitral award if enforcement
of such an award would be contrary to the public policy of the enforcing
nation. 35 The public policy exception to award enforcement is the most
widely asserted exception to award enforcement, especially in respect to
foreign arbitral awards or awards based on foreign law. In fact, the United
States Supreme Court, on numerous occasions, specifically has reserved the
right at the award enforcement stage to review an award to assure that the
combination of choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses in an agreement
to arbitrate did not serve to defeat statutorily protected rights in violation of
public policy. 36
The public policy exception is only to be employed "where enforcement
would violate [a] forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice."37
This restricted interpretation of the public policy exception is warranted in
order to safeguard the proarbitration policies of the New York Convention
and the FAA and to prevent the creation of a public policy loophole
encompassing not only foreign awards being enforced in the United States,
34 It should be noted at this juncture that even the public policy exception to
enforcement is discretionary in nature, meaning that even if an award violates the public
policy of an enforcing nation, that nation still may grant recognition and enforcement to
the award.
35 See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994); New York Convention,
supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42.
36 See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MIV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
540 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 n.19 (1985).
37 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier
(Rafta), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
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but also U.S. awards being enforced abroad. 38 The public policy exception is
further limited by the nature of the dispute and the type of public policy
involved. The nature of the transaction and the nationality of the parties
involved determines which of the following three types of public policy are
relevant: domestic, international, or transnational public policy. The standard
of review for annulling an arbitral award differs depending on which type of
public policy is applicable.
1. Domestic Public Policy
In a domestic arbitration (i.e., an arbitration involving only one nation
and citizens of only that one nation), an enforcing court need only take
cognizance of national public policy notions.39 The standard of review is
whether the arbitral award would violate local standards of morality and
justice.40 Because the underlying transaction only concerns one nation, the
enforcing court only needs to consider that nation's public policy, which is
usually its own notion of public policy. In the United States, domestic public
policy consists of those notions that would vitiate any contractual
relationship whether or not the contract contained an agreement to arbitrate.
In other words, the outside limit of domestic public policy is the parties'
freedom of contract under the interested nation's laws.41
2. International Public Policy
In an international arbitration (i.e., an arbitration involving two or more
nations and citizens of two or more nations), an enforcing court needs to take
cognizance not only of its own public policy, but also the public policy of
other interested nations and the special needs of international commerce.
Consequently, international public policy consists of those national public
policy concerns that also should be applied in an international context.42 One
nation's public policy "should prevail only if warranted by the nature of the
dispute," statute, or public policy objective involved, which should be
determined by comparing the connections existing between the case at hand
38 See id. at 973-74; see also Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 656 F.
Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (questioning the continued viability of the public policy
exception).
39 See Mark A. Buchanan, Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration,
AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 513 (1988).
40 See id.
41 See id.
4 2 See id. at 514.
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and each of the nations involved in the dispute.43 In other words,
international public policy is a balancing of the interests between the various
nations involved and the needs of international commerce for an equitable
resolution of international disputes.
Almost every major trading nation, either explicitly or by implication,
considers and employs international public policy when deciding whether to
enforce a foreign arbitral award. For example, French jurisprudence
specifically delineates between domestic public policy and international
public policy.44 On the other hand, U.S. jurisprudence views the
international aspect of an arbitration as a mitigating factor in deciding
whether an award is enforceable.45 No matter whether a court specifically
differentiates between national and international public policy, it is clear that
annulling an international arbitral award on public policy grounds is
extremely difficult. Only in the situation of a foreign arbitral forum and
foreign choice-of-law clause "'operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of
a party's right to pursue statutory remedies"' will a court condemn the award
as against public policy.46
43 ANDREAS BUCHER & PIERRE-YVES TSCHANZ, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN
SWITZERLAND 105 (1989).
44See Soci6t6 Labinal v. Soci6t6s Mors et Westland Aerospace, 4 REVUE DE
L'ARBITRAGE 645, 650 (1993); Soci6t6 Almira Films v. Pierrel es Quai, 4 REVUE DE
L'ARBITRAGE 711, 714-15 (1989).
45 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985) (holding that courts should be slower to annul international arbitral agreements
and awards because of "concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system"). However, U.S. courts specifically distinguish between "national"
and "public" policy by declaring that the public policy exception to enforcement should
not "enshrine... international politics under the rubric of 'public policy."' Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (Rafta), 508 F.2d
969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974); see also National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp.
800, 819-20 (D. Del. 1990); Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar, 417 F. Supp. 207, 216-17
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
4 6 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995)
(quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19). It should be noted that while this black letter
law is frequently quoted, rarely do courts ever find that the combination of foreign
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses has operated to waive a party's statutory
rights to the extent warranting denial of enforcement of an arbitral award. See Buchanan,
supra note 39, at 519.
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3. Transnational Public Policy
The third type of public policy considered by national courts in the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is transnational public
policy.47 Transnational public policy represents the "international consensus
as to universal standards of accepted norms or conduct that must always
apply and provide limitations to public as well as private international
relationships and transactions. '48  A national court need consider
transnational public policy only when the arbitration is both international in
scope and subject to the lex mercatoria.49
The lex mercatoria, or "law merchant," is a governing law that has no
direct connection to any national law but rather represents a combination of
"rules of law which are common to all or most of the States engaged in
international trade." 50 The lex mercatoria often is selected as a governing
law by parties to an international agreement as a method to avoid being
subjected to an undesirable foreign law when the parties cannot mutually
decide upon another governing law. This situation often arises when one of
the parties is a state or state-dominated enterprise, but it is not necessarily
limited to those circumstances. 51 The use of the lex mercatoria is highly
controversial and many even have questioned the very existence of the lex
mercatoria.52 However, for every detractor, there are those who steadfastly
believe in the existence of the lex mercatoria,53 and, in fact, the lex
47 See Buchanan, supra note 39, at 514.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 514-15.
50 Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 747 (1985). The definitions of the lex mercatoria are many and
diverse. Various authorities have described the lex mercatoria as an autonomous legal
order "independent of any one national legal system," Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex
Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's View, 6 ARB. INT'L 133, 144 (1990), and as representing
"generally accepted customs of merchants" that "have standardized over the years and
become part of formal law." Buchanan, supra note 39, at 511 n.2.
51 See BUCHER & TSCHANZ, supra note 43, at 106.
52 See, e.g., F.A. Mann, England Rejects "Delocalized" Contracts and Arbitration,
33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 193, 196-97 (1984). See generally Georges R. Delaume,
Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex
Mercatoria, 63 TuL. L. REV. 575 (1989); Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex
Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 613 (1989).
53 See generally Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of
Law-the Lex Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 113 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1987); Philippe Kahn, La Lex Mercatoria: Point
de Vue Francais Apres Quarante ans de Controverses, 37 McGILL L.J. 413 (1992).
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mercatoria has been employed as the governing law in various international
contracts. 54 The major problem hampering the use of the lex mercatoria in
international arbitration is the uncertainty over the exact definition and
parameters of the lex mercatoria. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, it is clear
that the lex mercatoria does exist, and, increasingly, international treaties,
model laws, and private organizations specializing in codifying international
trade norms are continuing to diminish this uncertainty by formulating and
elucidating generally accepted norms of commercial trade.
A court reviewing an international arbitral award based on the lex
mercatoria should apply "fundamental general principles of law without
inquiring whether the dispute has any relationship to a particular state."55 In
this way, transnational public policy is differentiated from international
public policy, for which a reviewing court must consider the public policy of
all interested states.56 Those transnational principles comprising the lex
mercatoria originate from the "international community of states" and
therefore "must be respected as international obligations of states" and
remain "independent from any relationship [the particular case] might have
to one state or another."57
C. The "Manifest Disregard of the Law" Exception to Award
Enforcement
The statutory exceptions to award enforcement enunciated in the FAA
and New York Convention, while the most frequently asserted exceptions by
parties attempting to avoid enforcement of an arbitral award, are not the only
exceptions to award enforcement. In U.S. jurisprudence, there exists a
nonstatutory exception to an arbitrator's award for those situations in which
an award is deemed in "manifest disregard of the law."'58
54 See Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Ras Al Khaimah
Nat'l Oil Co., 2 All E.R. 769, 778-79 (C.A. 1987); Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Yuval Ins. Co.,
1 Lloyd's Rep. 357, 359, 361-62 (C.A. 1977); see also Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v.
Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., 1 All E.R. 664, 670-91 (H.L. 1993).
55 BUCHER & TSCHANZ, supra note 43, at 120.
56 See Buchanan, supra note.39, at 513-14.
57 BUCHER & TSCHANZ, supra note 43, at 121.
58 See, e.g., Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp.: 779 F.2d 891, 892 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating
that an arbitrator's award "will not be confirmed if it is demonstrated that the arbitrator
acted in 'manifest disregard of the law."' (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37
(1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsoiAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 484 (1989))).
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As a general rule, an arbitral award cannot be set aside for errors in law
or fact by the arbitrators. The Supreme Court of the United States, long
before the drafting of either the FAA or the New York Convention, held that
if an arbitral award is within the submission of the arbitrators, a court "will
not set it aside for error, either in law or fact."'59 Despite this steadfast
refusal to recognize errors of law or fact as a basis for denying enforcement
of an award, parties have attempted to circumvent the Supreme Court and
argue that awards in "manifest disregard of the law" should not be
enforced. 60 The "manifest disregard" exception to award enforcement stems
from the case of Wilko v. Swan,6 1 in which the Court held that a domestic
dispute involving the Securities Act of 1933 was not arbitrable. 62
In Wilko, the Court stated that "interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error .... ,"63 In spite of the fact that the Court
subsequently overruled Wilko, 64 parties alleging that an arbitrator erred in a
matter of law have expanded the language of Wilko into a nonstatutory
exception to award enforcement. 65
The manifest disregard exception is to be construed conservatively and
employed rarely. An arbitrator not only must appreciate the existence of a
clearly governing and understandable legal principle but also decide to
ignore it in order for a corresponding award to be in manifest disregard of
59 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854); see also supra note 12 and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its ruling in Burchell by
holding that "courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though-
the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the
contract." United States Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
36 (1987).
60 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930,
933 (2d Cir. 1986).
61 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
62 See id. at 438.
6 3 Id. at 436.
64 At first, the Supreme Court merely distinguished Wilko, a domestic case, from
international cases, holding that international arbitrations involving securities disputes
were arbitral, while domestic cases were nonarbitral. See Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228-29 (1987). However, a few years later, the Supreme
Court completely reversed the Wilko opinion and declared that "Wilko was incorrectly
decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal
statutes governing arbitration agreements .... Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484;
see also supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
65 See, e.g., Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933.
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the law. 66 This conservative application of the manifest disregard exception
has been followed consistently by U.S. courts. 67- In fact, many courts
seriously question whether the manifest disregard exception really exists,
and others specifically limit this judicial exception' to domestic arbitrations,
holding that in international arbitrations under the New York Convention, no
such exception exists.68 Therefore, while courts may cite and consider the
manifest disregard exception to award enforcement, in reality, the exception
is little more than a historical oddity that is rarely, if ever, successfully
asserted. 69 Finally, the U.S. viewpoint that arbitrators need not explain their
reasoning further limits the manifest disregard exception, because without a
written opinion, it is almost impossible to determine whether an arbitrator
understood a legal principle but ignored the principle.70
The passage of the FAA and the New York Convention, and the
corresponding strict judicial interpretation of their provisions, has helped to
advance the use of international arbitration by assuring that arbitral awards
are recognized and enforced by national courts. Despite the success, or
perhaps because of the success, of the FAA and New York Convention,
parties have attempted both to limit and expand judicial review of arbitral
awards contractually. Such attempts have met with mixed success for a
variety of reasons.
66 See Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985).
67 See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier (Rafta), 508 F.2d 969, 977 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Southwind Shipping Co., 709 F.
Supp. 79, 83-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
68 See Parsons, 508 F.2d at 977; Avraham v. Shigur Express Ltd., No. 91 Civ. 1238
(SWK), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1991); Brandeis Intsel
Ltd. v. Calabrian Chems. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also
Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Now that
Wilko is history, there is no reason to continue to echo its gratuitous attempt at
nonstatutory supplementation.").
69 See, e.g., Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461-64
(1lth Cir. 1997) (employing the manifest disregard exception to vacate an arbitral award,
but only after holding that the arbitration panel's award specifically noted that counsel
for the successful party made a blatant appeal to the arbitrators to disregard the law); see
also Daniel Blonsky, The 11th Circuit Puts a Major New Dent in the Armor Surrounding
Arbitration Awards, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1998, at 74, 76.
70 See Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990); Sobel v. Hertz,
Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972).
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IT[. CONTRACTUAL EXPANSION AND LIMITATION OF JuDICIAL REVIEW
AT THE AWARD ENFORCEMENT STAGE
Parties agree to arbitrate disputes for several reasons. For instance, in
international agreements, arbitration is considered a neutral forum when
parties cannot agree on which nation's courts should have jurisdiction over a
dispute. Arbitration also is considered generally less time consuming and
expensive than litigation. Further, in arbitral proceedings, parties, to a
certain extent, can control the makeup of the arbitral panel, thereby
employing arbitrators who possess knowledge and expertise in certain areas
of the law or business community. 71 The advantages of arbitration are united
in a common thread. In order to benefit from these advantages, any
corresponding arbitral award needs to be recognized and enforced by
national courts. The FAA, on a national scale, and the New York
Convention, on an international scale, have gone a long way to unify
arbitration law and assure the enforceability of awards. However, in some
instances, parties to agreements to arbitrate have attempted to alter the effect
of the FAA and New York Convention contractually, either by expanding or
limiting judicial review of arbitral awards.
A. Contractual Expansion of Judicial Review
The standard of judicial review under the FAA and New York
Convention, as discussed above in detail, is extremely limited. The effect of
this limited judicial review is that the vast majority of arbitral awards are
recognized and enforced as a matter of course not only in U.S. courts but
also around the world. In this regard, parties have attempted to enlarge the
judicial role in reviewing arbitral awards contractually beyond that
contemplated by the FAA and New York Convention. These attempts have
met with mixed results-some being enforced on the theory of freedom of
contract and others being denied on the basis of preserving the integrity of
the arbitral process in accordance with public policy underlying the FAA and
New York Convention.
71 For an exhaustive listing of the strengths of arbitration, see Robert Donald Fischer
& Roger S. Haydock, International Commercial Disputes: Drafting an Enforceable
Arbitration Agreement, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 941, 947-56 (1996).
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1. The Freedom of Contract Viewpoint
In Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,72 the
-United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal
Arbitration Act does not prohibit parties who voluntarily agree to arbitration
from providing contractually for a more expansive judicial review of an
award than the default standard provided in the FAA.73 In Gateway, MCI
Telecommunications Corp. (MCI), after successfully bidding on a
government contract to supply telephone service to state inmates,
subcontracted with Gateway Technologies, Inc. (Gateway) to furnish, install,
and maintain all the equipment necessary to provide automated collect
calls.74 The subcontract agreement contained an arbitration clause providing
that in the event any disputes between the parties arose, the parties agree to
binding arbitration, "except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal." 75
A dispute arose between the parties with MCI contending that the
Gateway automated system design was improperly completing many collect
calls, and Gateway responding by alleging that MCI merely wished to
integrate the Gateway system into its own, thereby realizing a significant
profit.76 Eventually, MCI integrated the two systems and terminated its
contract with Gateway. The dispute was submitted to arbitration, and "the
arbitrator found that MCI had breached its contractual duty to negotiate in
good faith and awarded actual as well as punitive damages to Gateway." 77
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
confirmed the arbitral award, refusing to review the award under a strict
"errors of law" analysis, in deference to the federal policy favoring
arbitration. 78 MCI appealed, arguing that the court erred in not reviewing the
award for "errors of law" in accordance with the parties' agreement to
arbitrate disputes.
The Fifth Circuit held that such a contractual modification expanding the
court's power to review an arbitral award was acceptable because
"arbitration is a creature of contract."79 The court reasoned that the public
policy purpose of the FAA was to assure that private agreements to arbitrate
72 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
73 See id. at 997.
74 See id. at 995.
75 Id.
7 6 See id. at 995 n.2.
7 7 Id. at 996.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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are enforced according to their terms and that "'the FAA's pro-arbitration
policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting
parties."' 80 The Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's unwillingness to
enforce the parties' contract because "the parties have sacrificed the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration on the altar of appellate
review."81 While conceding that the parties' agreement to expand judicial
review may not have been "prudent," the Fifth Circuit reasoned that federal
arbitration policy demanded that the court conduct its review according to
the terms of the arbitration contract.82
The Fifth Circuit in Gateway relied upon several United States Supreme
Court decisions in which the Court upheld a party's right to select the
procedural rules that will govern an arbitration. 83 However, Gateway did not
concern the selection of procedural rules governing the arbitral process but
rather concerned the judicial enforcement of a corresponding award.
Nonetheless, the decision in Gateway is not without precedent. Other federal
and state courts have upheld the contractual expansion of judicial review
over arbitral awards in substantially similar circumstances. 84 On the other
hand, the Fifth Circuit decision in Gateway was not the end of the debate.
80 Id. (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57
(1995)).
81 Id. at 997.
82 Id.
83 See id. at 996-97 (citing, inter alia, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MIV
Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995) (enforcing a contractual provision mandating
arbitration in Tokyo, Japan); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-
71 (1995) (saying that the FAA "intended courts to enforce arbitration agreements into
which parties had entered and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts"); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 469 (1989) (concluding that appellant had no right to compel
arbitration because the parties' agreement did not require arbitration to proceed in this
situation)).
84 See Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 916 F. Supp. 638, 641-42 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (upholding an "errors of law" contractual standard of review); Fils et Cables
d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(upholding a contractual grant of the power to review an award for errors of law and
fact); Primerica Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wise, 456 S.E.2d 631, 633-34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a contractual provision providing that a reviewing court "may also vacate,
modify or correct the award if the conclusions of law are contrary to law, or if the
findings of fact are not supported by the facts," is enforceable).
354
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2. Preserving the Integrity of the Arbitral Process
In LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,85 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that while parties
may contract freely with respect to the manner in which they arbitrate their
disputes, they may not, by agreement, expand the provisions for judicial
review contained in the FAA. 86 LaPine concerned the enforceability of an
arbitral award conducted before a panel of the International Court of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).87 The
underlying dispute concerned an agreement between LaPine Technology
Corporation (LaPine), Kyocera Corporation (Kyocera), and Prudential
Capital and Investment Services, Inc. (Prudential). In short, the agrement
provided for the design, manufacture, and marketing of a computer disk
drive whereby LaPine was to design and market the product, Prudential was
to finance the product, and Kyocera was to actually manufacture the disk
drive. 88
The project ran into immediate financial problems and a complicated
reorganization of the parties' agreement commenced. 89 Eventually, the
parties entered into a definitive agreement that contained an arbitration
agreement in the event of disputes. The arbitration agreement provided for
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of
the ICC.90 The arbitral agreement also stated that any corresponding award
shall be vacated or modified not only on the basis of the FAA but also when
an enforcing court finds that the award was based on errors of fact or law.91
The ICC arbitral panel rendered an award in LaPine's favor and against
Kyocera, and, thereafter, LaPine moved the court to confirm the arbitral
award while Kyocera moved the court to vacate the award. 92 Kyocera's main
contention was that the arbitrators had made errors of fact 'and law;
consequently, according to the parties' agreement to arbitrate, the district
court should vacate the arbitral award.93
85 909 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd, 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
86 See id. at 703.
87 See id. at 698-99.
88 See id. at 699.
89 See id. at 700-01.
90 See id.'at 702; see also RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION (Int'l Chamber
of Commerce 1988).
91 See LaPine, 909 F. Supp. at 702.
92 See id. at 701.
93 See id. at 701-02.
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The district court held that while parties may contract freely with respect
to the manner in which they arbitrate their disputes, parties may not by
agreement alter by expansion the provisions for judicial review contained in
the FAA.94 The court specifically cited and took judicial notice of Gateway
and other decisions upholding contractual provisions that expand a court's
review of awards but declined to follow those decisions.95
The court's reasoning was twofold. First, the court reasoned that federal
jurisdiction cannot be created by contract and that the role of the federal
courts cannot be subverted to serve the private interest at the whim of the
contracting parties. In other words, while parties may regulate fully by
agreement the conduct of arbitration proceedings, they may not enlarge the
adjudicatory process by enlarging the limits upon it set by statute. 96 Second,
the court reasoned that allowing parties to expand the scope of judicial
review contractually was repugnant to public policy. Arbitration, reasoned
the court, is motivated by a desire to avoid the delay and costs of a judicial
trial, and, in this regard, a court should refrain from substituting its judgment
for that of the arbitrator's in order to assure the finality of an award. 97
Therefore, the court held that a more serious obstacle to the contractual
expansion of judicial review was grounded in public policy-the public
policy that supports arbitration and those aspects of arbitration that are
beneficial to the parties as well as to the courts whose responsibilities are
eased by alternative forms of dispute resolution.98
The district court decision in LaPine is not without judicial authority and
persuasive precedent. In Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago
Sun-Times,99 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit held that parties to an
arbitration agreement could not contract for judicial review of an award
because a court's jurisdiction cannot be created by contract. Furthermore,
the court's deference to the public policy behind arbitration, especially in
light of the FAA and the New York Convention, 100 demonstrates an attempt
to protect the integrity of the arbitral process, because allowing parties to
94 See id. at 703.
95 See id. at 702-04 (citing Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d
993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995); Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F.
Supp. 240, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
96 See id. at 703.
97 See id. at 705.
98 See id. at 705-06. The court severed the provision expanding judicial review from
the rest of the agreement and proceeded to review the ICC arbitral award on the basis of
the FAA. The court found the award valid and enforceable. See id. at 706-09.
99 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
100 See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
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expand judicial review contractually, in contrast to the limited review
offered by statute, would serve to diminish the reputation of commercial
arbitration as an effective form of alternative dispute resolution. 101 However,
such public policy concerns are not implicated when parties to an arbitral
agreement contract for limited judicial review.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in
LaPine.10 2 The Ninth Circuit sided with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in the
Gateway decision and held that the parties' agreement to expand judicial
review must be honored.10 3 The Ninth Circuit cited the same Supreme Court
cases cited by the Fifth Circuit on the freedom of contract and held that the
purpose behind the FAA was not to relieve overburdened court dockets, but
merely to avert judicial interference with the contractual rights of parties to
arbitration agreements. 104 However, the Ninth Circuit, as the Fifth Circuit,
failed to consider the difference between freedom of contract regarding
procedural rules rather than substantive rules and failed to consider the
interplay between the FAA and the New York Convention. These
considerations indicate that contractual expansion of judicial review is not
appropriate, especially in international arbitrations, and that the district court
in LaPine came to the proper conclusion.
B. Contractual Limitation of Judicial Review
Despite the limited standard of judicial review offered by the FAA and
the New York Convention, parties to arbitral agreements may wish to limit
the possibility and purview of judicial review further. The intent behind
further limitation of judicial review at the award enforcement stage is
obvious-parties enter into arbitral agreements to avoid the necessity and
cost of litigating a controversy in a national court; therefore, protracted
litigation at the award enforcement stage would serve to counter any benefits
bestowed by the initial choice of arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution technique. This overriding policy objective is enhanced only when
the arbitration is of an international nature. In an international arbitration,
the various parties -hail from differing nations which may have vastly
101 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
102 See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997).
103 See id.
104 See id. at 890-91 (citing First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55 (1995); Volt Info.
Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-79
(1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)).
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different legal systems. Consequently, arbitration may be the only effective
compromise if a dispute arises. If, after a successful arbitration, such parties
still are faced with prolonged and costly award enforcement litigation in a
foreign court, all the benefits of arbitration would be destroyed, especially
the neutral forum so cherished by participants in international trade. 105 As a
result, some parties to an arbitral agreement find it prudent to foreclose the
possibility of disputing an arbitral award in a national court. Such a
foreclosure either may be expressed directly in an agreement to arbitrate or
may be implied through the selection of certain rules governing the arbitral
process.
1. Express Limitation of Judicial Review-Exclusion Agreements
Other than the New York Convention, English law on arbitration
basically was combined in three national acts, each of which added a facet to
English arbitration law. These acts include the Arbitration Act of 1950,106
the Arbitration Act of 1975,107 and the Arbitration Act of 1979.108 Many of
the provisions of these acts have been repealed by, and were consolidated
and recodified in, the Arbitration Act of 1996.109 According to the
Arbitration Act of 1996, parties to an arbitration may, before or after a
dispute arises, agree in writing to waive the right to bring questions of law
before the courts.1 10 The effect of such an agreement is to eliminate most
judicial review of arbitral awards rendered in England. Until 1996, these
"exclusion agreements," as they are commonly called, were valid only in
international arbitrations and were not recognized when all the parties
involved were British, unless the exclusion agreement was entered into after
the commencement of arbitral proceedings." 'I
However, an arbitral award still can be set aside for lack of "substantive
jurisdiction,"'112 "serious irregularity affecting the [arbitral] tribunal, the
105 See Ray Y. Chan, Note, The Enforceability of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards
in the United States: A Critique of Chromally, B.U. INT'L L.J. 141, 174 (1999) (referring
to the "obvious needs of international trade for a neutral forum of dispute resolution").
106 Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 27, §§ 1-34, 42(3) (Eng.) (repealed
1996).
107 Arbitration Act, 1975, ch. 3, §§ 1-8 (Eng.) (repealed 1996).
108 Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42, §§ 1-8 (Eng.) (repealed 1996).
109 Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, §§ 1-10 (Eng.).
110 See id. §§ 5, 6(1), 69(1).
111 See Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42, § 3(6) (repealed 1996).
112 Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 67(3).
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[arbitral] proceedings or the [arbitral] award," 113 and for an arbitrator's
mistake in determining "a question of law arising out of an award made in
the proceedings." 114 Under the Arbitration Act of 1979, an exclusion
agreement under English law was required to be in writing but needed not
expressly be labeled an exclusion agreement. In fact, the text of the 1979 Act
specifically stated that an agreement could be an exclusion agreement
"whether or not it form[ed] part of an arbitration agreement." l 5
Consequently, an exclusion agreement could exist even outside the context
of the arbitral agreement. In this regard, courts have found the use of
exclusion agreements by the mere implied reference to the binding nature of
arbitral awards located in the procedural rules chosen by the parties to
govern the arbitral process.
2. Implied Limitation of Judicial Review-Selection of Governing
Rules
English courts have interpreted the definition of "exclusion agreement"
liberally. For example, in Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Shell Petroleum
Development Ltd.,116 the English Court of Appeal held that a valid exclusion
agreement was incorporated by the parties by their selection of the ICC
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration as governing the procedure of the
arbitral process. In Marine Contractors, Marine Contractors, Inc. (Marine)
contracted with Petroleum Development of Nigeria Ltd. (Shell) to lay oil
pipeline in Nigeria."17 The contract contained an arbitral clause providing
for the arbitration of any disputes in London under the auspices of the
ICC.118 The arbitrator made an interim award and Marine applied for leave
to appeal, which the court denied, holding that a valid exclusion agreement
existed. 119
113 Id. § 68(3); see also William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice:
Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647,
693 (1989).
'14 Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 69(1); see also id. § 69(7).
115 Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42, § 3 (repealed 1996). It should be noted that
Belgium has gone one step further than merely allowing exclusion agreements. Belgian
law mandates that if all the parties to an arbitration are foreign, a corresponding arbitral
award rendered in Belgium is not subject to an action for annulment. See CODE OF
JUDICIARE art. 1717 (Belg.).
116 2 Lloyd's Rep. 77 (C.A. 1984).
117 See id. at 78-79.
118 See id.
119 See id. at78.
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The court interpreted Article 24 of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration, 120 which provides that a corresponding "arbitral award shall be
final" and that by submitting the dispute to arbitration by the ICC "the
parties shall be deemed.., to have waived their right to any form of appeal
insofar as such waiver can validly be made," as by implication forming an
exclusion agreement. 121 Therefore, in England, a valid exclusion agreement
need not be expressed specifically by the parties but may be implied through
the selection of a set of procedural rules waiving the right to appeal. ' 22
The implied formation of an exclusion agreement is not necessarily a
phenomenon limited to English courts. In CBI NZ Ltd. v. Badger Chiyoda,123
the New Zealand Court of Appeal upheld the implied incorporation of an
exclusion agreement through the use of the ICC Rules even in the face of a
public policy challenge. The New Zealand court reasoned that the implied
exclusion agreement was valid and not contrary to public policy because
"modem public policy points strongly towards non-interference with arbitral
decisions if the parties clearly intended them to be final."124 Nevertheless,
the court did place at least two restrictions on the use of implied exclusion
agreements. First, the court held that arbitrator misconduct and an arbitration
in excess of the terms of reference remained opened to appeal
notwithstanding the implied use of an exclusion agreement. Second, the
court held that it still may intervene if unequal bargaining power or
exploitation of a monopoly position forced a party to submit to an exclusion
agreement. 125
The use of exclusion agreements in commonwealth and continental
European nations has gained popularity in the last few decades, although this
trend is yet to cross the Atlantic into the United States. 126 The increased use
12 0 See RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 24
(International Chamber of Commerce 1988).
121 Id.; see also Marine Contractors, 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 79.
122 See Marine Contractors, 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 79; see also Arab African Energy
Corp. v. Olieprodukten Nederland, B.V., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 419, 423 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1983)
(holding that the Arbitration Act of 1979 did not require "the overt demonstration of an
intention to exclude the right of appeal"; thus, the inclusion of the ICC Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration was sufficient evidence of an exclusion agreement).
123 [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 669.
124 id. at 680.
125 See id. at 679. The New Zealand Court of Appeal recognized the probability that
one party would have such an unequal bargaining position so as to justify the
nullification of an exclusion agreement was slight in an international arbitration but more
likely in a domestic arbitration. See id.
126 There appears to be no real mention of "exclusion agreements" in American law,
although some cases tend to hint at the acceptance of contractual limitation of judicial
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of exclusion agreements demonstrates the integrity of the arbitral process
and the trust that parties to an arbitral agreement have in such a process. The
use of exclusion agreements not only will assure the uninterrupted
enforcement of arbitral awards, but also will promote the intentions. of the
parties in agreeing to arbitrate disputes. However, concerns over the lack of
any judicial review in the event that the integrity of the arbitral process
erodes is still a major concern. Furthermore, how courts should reconcile the
increased use of the contractual expansion of judicial review versus *the
increased use of contractual limitation of judicial review presents a public
policy quagmire that warrants further discussion.
IV. RECONCILING THE CONTRACTUAL
EXPANSION AND LIMITATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
As parties to both national and international agreements to arbitrate
continue to experiment with contractual clauses that either expand or limit
judicial review of arbitral awards,. the dichotomy between the seemingly
competing public policy forces of contractual freedom and award
enforcement will become further pronounced. However, the seemingly
irreconcilable conflict between freedom to contract and strict award
enforcement can best be resolved by evaluating these two public policy
viewpoints in connection with the two major goals of the FAA and the New
York Convention.
The drafters of the FAA and the New York Convention envisioned an
arbitration system whereby national tribunals would not only recognize and
enforce agreements to arbitrate, but also would recognize and strictly enforce
corresponding arbitral awards. Only if these two goals are met will
arbitration become a viable alternative dispute resolution technique for
parties. By evaluating contractual expansion and limitation of judicial review
in the context of these two goals, contractual freedom can be expanded while
still maintaining the overall integrity of the arbitral process.
A. Procedural Versus Substantive Freedom of Contract
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits in the Gateway and LaPine decisions relied
heavily upon the notion of freedom of contract in upholding contractual
review. For example, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority,
14 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit upheld an arbitral clause that limited
judicial review to an "arbitrary and capricious" standard, see id. at 822-23.
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expansion of judicial review. 127 However, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
failed to realize the difference between procedural and substantive freedom
of contract. The district court in the LaPine decision touched upon this
concern but did not elaborate, merely stating that enlargement of judicial
review was outside of the permissible range of a party's freedom of
contract. 128 Nevertheless, the district court made the right decision even
though its reasoning was not fully developed.
'The appellate decisions in Gateway and LaPine both relied on a
multitude of decisions enforcing the parties' freedom of contract in regards
to various aspects of the arbitral process. 129 However, all of these decisions
concerned the scope and procedural regulations of the arbitral process, not
the substantive enforcement of awards or of the arbitration agreement itself.
For instance, in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University,130 the United States Supreme Court
upheld a California appellate court's decision holding that parties may
contract for the California Rules of Arbitration, rather than the FAA, to
govern the procedural regulations of their arbitration. 131
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has upheld parties'
contractual freedom as to the scope of the arbitration and the issues an
arbitrator is empowered to decide. For instance, parties are free to contract
as to whether arbitrators will have the authority to award punitive
damages 132 and are even free to grant the arbitrators the power to decide the
127 See generally LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir.
1997); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995);
supra notes 63-74, 89-90 and accompanying text.
128 See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 705 (N.D. Cal.
1995), rev'd, 130 F.3d 884. The district court relied heavily upon the Seventh Circuit
decision in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d
1501 (7th Cir. 1991). However, as rightly pointed out by the appellate court in LaPine,
the Seventh Circuit only in dicta asserted that federal jurisdiction could not be created by
contract and declined to explain its reasoning. See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 890.
129 See, e.g., LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888 (citing, inter alia, First Options, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (enforcing an arbitral agreement limiting the scope of
the issues submitted to arbitration); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514
U.S. 52, 55 (1995) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate and upholding the resulting
arbitral award of punitive damages despite contrary state law)); see also Gateway, 64
F.3d at 997 (citing, inter alia, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226 (1987) (stating that courts should "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate")).
130 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
131 See id. at 468-69.
132 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 56-57.
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arbitrability issue itself.133 Finally, parties are free to contract as to the
forum in which any judicial dispute concerning the arbitration agreement or
award may be commenced. 134 Consequently, it is undisputed that the powers
of an arbitrator derive from, and are limited by, the agreement to arbitrate. 135
Nevertheless, while parties are free to contract as to the procedure,
scope, and forum of an arbitration, parties are not necessarily free to contract
as to the extent of judicial review of an arbitral award. 136 An expansion of
judicial review would go beyond merely contracting as to the scope or
procedure of the arbitration and would be contracting as to the substantive
enforcement of the award. Such a process would contradict the limited
judicial review standards enunciated in the FAA and New York Convention.
In fact, the majority of exceptions to award enforcement in the FAA and
New York Convention deal with procedural irregularities to assure that the
parties' freedom to contract for arbitration does not impermissibly overstep
all bounds of fairness and justice. 137 Only the public policy exception
encompasses a substantive review of the arbitral award, and even this
exception is narrowly interpreted to protect the integrity of the arbitral
process.138
In short, parties should be allowed to negotiate contractually as to the
scope and procedure of arbitration, but not as to the substantive enforcement
of arbitral agreements or awards. Such appears to have been the case in the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.139 In Volt, the
parties to a contract agreed not only to arbitrate all disputes between the
parties but also included a provision in the contract that the law of California
133 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 943-44. However, granting parties the right to decide
the arbitrability of an issue may encroach impermissibly upon the public policy exception
to award enforcement. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill of
Rights and Law Practice Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 1,
17-18 (1995); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
134 See McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters, 944 F.2d 1199, 1208-09 (5th
2ir. 1991).
135 See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1002 (Cal.
1994).
136 See, e.g., Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935
?.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991).
137 See Federal Arbitration Act §§ 10-11, 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994), New York
onvention, supra note 4, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42.
138 See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
apier (Rakta), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974); Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian
hems. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
139 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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would govern all disputes. 140 However, the California Arbitration Act
contained a provision allowing a court to stay arbitration pending the
resolution of a related litigation, while the FAA contained no such provision.
As a result, the party opposing arbitration argued that the choice of
California law violated the provisions of the FAA. 141
The United States Supreme Court recognized that section 4 of the FAA,
on enforcement of arbitral agreements, "does not confer a right to compel
arbitration of any dispute at any time, [but merely] confers.., the right to
obtain an order directing that 'arbitration proceed in the manner provided for
in [the parties'] agreement.' ' 142 The Court went on to reason that the
California Arbitration Act did not offend the federal policy favoring
arbitration since there is no federal policy favoring arbitration "under a
certain set of procedural rules."' 143 Consequently, the Court held that by
permitting courts to enforce rigorously such arbitration agreements
according to their terms, the Court would give effect to the contractual rights
and expectations of the parties without doing violence to the policies behind
the FAA.144
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in Volt reaffirmed the right of parties
to contract as to the procedural rules of an arbitration because such freedom
of contract would not interfere with the policies of the FAA to favor
arbitration and arbitral agreements. 145 However, to allow parties to contract
as to substantive enforcement would endanger the integrity of the arbitral
process and hamper the effectiveness of arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution technique, thereby "doing violence" to the policies behind the
FAA. 146 These concerns are further highlighted when the arbitration and
parties are international in nature.
B. The FAA Versus the New York Convention
The United States enacted the FAA on February 12, 1925.147 As stated
before, the goal of the FAA was to place arbitration agreements "upon the
140 See id. at 470.
141 See id. at 471-72.
142 See id. at 474-75 (quoting Federal Arbitration Act § 4, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994))
(emphasis added and removed) (bracketed alteration in original).
143 Id. at 476.
144 See id. at 479.
145 See id. at 478-79.
146 Id. at 479.
147 See Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § I note (1994) (Derivation).
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same footing as other contracts."1 48 On the other hand, Congress, in passing
the FAA, also recognized the benefits offered by arbitration, especially the
fact that arbitration of disputes is usually less costly and time consuming
than litigation. 149 However, in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, °50 the
United States Supreme Court held that the overriding concern of Congress in
passing the FAA was to assure enforcement of agreements into which parties
had entered, not to realize and promote the benefits of arbitration. 151
Therefore, federal courts consistently have held that the FAA preempts
state laws that tend to interfere with parties' contractual right to enter into
arbitration agreements. For instance, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,152 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a provision of the California
Franchise Investment Law requiring judicial interpretation of claims arising
under that law violated the federal provisions of the FAA and, as a result,
allowed the arbitration of various claims under the law. 153 Similarly, three
years later, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a provision of
the California Labor Code that purportedly authorized employees access to
the courts in an action for wages despite the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate such controversies. 154  Since such rulings, federal courts
consistently have held that the FAA preempts state laws that, limit parties'
ability to enter into arbitration agreements. 155
The United States acceded to and enacted the New York Convention on
July 31, 1970.156 The underlying goals of the New York Convention differ
148 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924); see also supra notes 2-3.
149 The House Report accompanying the FAA stated that "[i]t is practically
appropriate that the action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation
against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by
agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable."
H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
150 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
151 See id. at 218-19.
152 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
153 See id. at 11, 14, 16.
154 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987).
155 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (declaring
unlawful any state policy that will uphold a contract but will not enforce an agreement to
arbitrate located in such a contract); Baravati v. Josephtahl, Lyon & Ross, Inc. 28 F.3d
704, 711 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the FAA preempts an Illinois rule concerning the
award of punitive damages by arbitrators); S+L+H S.P.A., Viale F. Cessani 15 24047
Treviglio, Italy v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d 1518, 1526-27 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a provision of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law could not void an
arbitration agreement).
156 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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from those of the FAA. The primary goal underlying the adoption and
implementation of the New York Convention by the United States was to
"unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and
arbitral awards are enforced in signatory countries." 157 The rationale behind
unifying standards in regards to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
agreements is rooted in the very nature of international transactions. At
times, parties to an international transaction desire an independent and
neutral forum in the event any disputes arise. For instance, a foreign
corporation may, rightly or wrongly, be apprehensive over litigating a
dispute in the courts of its adversaries' nations. This is particularly true
when one of the parties is a state-owned or state-supported entity. 158
Consequently, the New York Convention presented an opportunity to unify
international standards of arbitration in order to promote arbitration as an
alternative method of dispute resolution. 159
In fact, just as the FAA preempts any contradictory state laws, the New
York Convention preempts any contradictory provisions of the FAA
whenever an arbitration agreement is international in nature, that is, between
parties that are not entirely U.S. citizens. For example, in McDennott
International v. Lloyds Underwriters,160 the Fifth Circuit held that the
FAA's requirement that both parties' consent before an arbitral award could
be affirmed was preempted by the New York Convention, which does not
require consent for confirmation. 16 1 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the FAA
is the approximate domestic equivalent of the New York Convention, such
that the New York Convention incorporates the FAA except where the FAA
conflicts with the New York Convention's specific provisions.162
The differing goals of the FAA and the New York Convention and the
difference between substantive and procedural freedom of contract may shed
light upon whether parties should be allowed to expand or limit judicial
review over arbitral awards. The goals of the FAA and the New York
157 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974) (citing
CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS,
S. EXEC. Doc. E (2d Sess. 1968)).
158 See John R. Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in International
Trade: A Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World
Vlarket, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 361, 379 (1986); Harry P. de Vries, International
ommercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV.
2, 64-67 (1982).
159 See de Vries, supra note 158, at 56-57.
160 120 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 1997).
161 See id. at 588-89.
162 See id. at 588.
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Convention can be reconciled and promoted by allowing contractual
limitation of judicial review and disallowing contractual expansion.
C. Contractual Expansion Versus Contractual Limitation of Judicial
Review
As discussed above, national tribunals not only have recognized the
ability of parties to expand judicial review of arbitral awards contractually,
but also have recognized the right to limit judicial review contractually. 163
However, while the contractual limitation of judicial review tends to
promote the overall goals of both the FAA and the New York Convention,
contractual expansion tends to contradict, at least in part, some of the goals
of the FAA and the New York Convention. Nevertheless, the seemingly
irreconcilable conflict between the twin goals of promoting freedom of
contract in regard to arbitral agreements and the strict enforcement of
arbitral awards is not as irreconcilable as the conflict first appears.
The first step to reconciling contractual expansion and limitation of the
judicial review of arbitral awards is to recognize the difference in the types
of contractual expansion and limitation. Arbitration is not a judicial process
but rather is an alternative method of dispute resolution with differing rules,
regulations, and procedures. In fact, there are literally hundreds of differing
procedural rules and regulations promulgated not only by national and state
legislatures but also by private institutions such as the American Arbitration
Association and the ICC. As a result, parties considering arbitration have no
dearth of arbitration rules from which to choose. Moreover, parties
commonly contractually choose a particular set of rules to apply to any
dispute and may even modify portions of those rules contractually.
Therefore, allowing parties to contract freely as to procedural rules and the
scope of any arbitration not only promotes freedom of contract, but also
promotes arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution technique.
On the other hand, the substantive review and enforcement of arbitral
awards by national courts is severely restricted in the United States by the
FAA and internationally by the New York Convention. Allowing parties to
expand such review contractually certainly would also expand the parties'
freedom of contract, but would also endanger the goal of the FAA and the
New York Convention of assuring certainty and predictability in the
enforcement of arbitral awards. However, allowing parties to limit
contractually the already stringent standards of judicial review not only
163 See supra Part I.
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would expand freedom of contract, but also would increase the certainty and
predictability of award enforcement.
The desire for certainty and predictability in award enforcement is self-
evident in an international arbitration but is also applicable in a purely
domestic arbitration. For example, if an Alaskan corporation enters into a
contract with a Florida corporation to provide needed raw materials, the two
corporations may decide to arbitrate any disputes in Los Angeles County,
California-a neutral forum and a relatively halfway point between the home
bases of the two corporations. If the Florida corporation is successful, any
corresponding arbitral award would have to be recognized by the Alaskan
courts in order for the Florida corporation to seize any assets of the Alaskan
corporation to satisfy the arbitral award. The award enforcement procedure
may be jeopardized if the Alaskan courts can review the arbitral award de
novo, and the Florida corporation may find itself relitigating the dispute in
the Alaskan courts, which is exactly what the Florida corporation sought to
avoid in entering into an arbitration agreement.
The district court in LaPine appeared to recognize to an extent the
difference between procedural and substantive freedom of contract. 164
However, the district court failed to elaborate further on the public policy
considerations of the same, but rather it merely held that parties to an
arbitration agreement could not upset the judicial review limits set by
statute-presumably neither enlarging nor limiting such review. 165 On
review, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize the public policy differences in
procedural versus substantive contractual expansion and limitation. The
Ninth Circuit merely held that the FAA was not designed to "avert
overburdened court dockets."'166 The Ninth Circuit failed to grasp that
contractual expansion of judicial review interferes with one of the main
reasons parties enter into arbitral agreements, that is, to avoid the judicial
process and being subjected to the courts of an adversary. Strict adherence to
the notion of freedom of contract in allowing expansion of judicial review is
perhaps merely a revival of the old judicial hostility towards arbitration that
the FAA sought to remedy.167
The second step to reconciling contractual expansion and limitation is to
recognize the difference between national and international arbitration. As
discussed above, the underlying goals of the FAA and the New York
Convention differ in that the FAA sought to reverse past judicial hostility
164 See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 703 (N.D. Cal.
1995), rev'd, 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997).
165 See id.
166 LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1997).
167 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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toward arbitration, while the New York Convention sought to unify
international standards by which agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards
are enforced. 168 The rationale behind the New York Convention is self-
evident-the primary reason why parties to an international transaction
desire arbitration is to assure that any disputes are resolved in a neutral
forum rather than the national courts of one of the parties. 169 The desire for a
neutral forum is even more pronounced where one of the parties is a state-
owned or supported enterprise. 170 To relieve these concerns, the New York
Convention dictates that arbitral awards will be recognized in the court of a
signatory nation except in a few limited circumstances. 171
In the international context, contractual limitation of judicial review
enhances both the parties' freedom of contract and the desire to assure the
enforceability of any corresponding arbitral award. On the other hand,
contractual expansion of judicial review could serve as a mechanism to
circumvent the goal of the New York Convention to unify national laws on
arbitration in order to promote international trade and commerce. The
district court and the Ninth Circuit in the LaPine case both failed to
recognize this critical difference. The LaPine case involved the
quintessential international transaction-a sale of goods between an
American and a Japanese corporation. 172 As a result, the New York
Convention should have applied to the transaction, not the FAA. 173
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit in LaPine only discussed the FAA and not
the New York Convention 174 even though the goals and provisions of the
New York Convention should have taken precedence over those of the FAA.
In short,
[i]f the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international
accords [such as the New York Convention] and have a role as a trusted
partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious in
16 8 See infra Part IV.B.
169 See Chan, supra note 105, at 174.
170 See Allison, supra note 158, at 379.
171 See discussion infra Part II.
172 See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1997).
173 One can contrast the LaPine case with the Fifth Circuit Gateway case, which
was essentially a sales and service contract between two domestic corporations. Compare
LaPine, 130 F.3d at 886, with Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d
993, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1995).
174 See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 887-91.
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applying goals from domestic legislation [such as the FAA] in such a
manner as to violate international agreements. 175
Reconciling the goals of the FAA and the New York Convention when
considering the validity of contractual expansion or limitation of judicial
review is a relatively simple matter. First, one must determine if the
contractual provision effects a procedural or substantive rule of arbitration.
Procedural rules can always be revised by contract, but substantive rules
should only be allowed to be revised when they will further promote not
only freedom of contract but also the underlying desire to have certainty and
predictability in the enforcement of an arbitral decision. Second, one must
determine if the arbitration is of a domestic or international nature. In an
international arbitration, the goals of uniformity, certainty, and predictability
should take precedence over freedom of contract, or else the use of
international arbitration would be jeopardized. Therefore, in almost all
situations, contractual limitation of judicial review should be allowed while
contractual expansion beyond that offered by the FAA and the New York
Convention as to the substantive review of an award should be disallowed. A
stringent adherence to the freedom of contract notion in all situations,
including contractual expansion of judicial review, would serve only to
damage the integrity of the arbitral process and serve to reincarnate the old
judicial hostility toward arbitration that was thought to be buried by the
FAA.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in recent decades arbitration increasingly has become
a desirable alternative to litigation as a method of dispute resolution,
especially between parties of differing nationalities. In order to promote
arbitration, the United States enacted both the FAA and the New York
Convention. Both of these legislative enactments severely limit judicial
review of the arbitral process and any corresponding award. In recent years,
parties have attempted either to expand or limit judicial review of arbitral
awards contractually. Provisions expanding or limiting judicial review have
been held enforceable under the doctrine of freedom of contact. However,
contractual expansion of judicial review can have adverse effects on the
integrity of the arbitral process. This is especially true in an international
context. Consequently, a strict, unguided adherence to the principle of
175 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539
(1995).
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freedom of contract needs to be tempered with a respect for the arbitral
process and the goals of both the FAA and the New York Convention.

